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PATENTLY OURS?  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DNA 
PATENTS 
Vincent Y. Ling* 
There has never been a challenge to the principle of equal opportunity as 
powerful as the threat posed by [genetic] technologies, with the possible, 
hardly democratic, exception of slavery. 
—Maxwell J. Mehlman and Jeffrey R. Botkin1 
INTRODUCTION 
The controversy surrounding patenting deoxyribonucleic acid 
(“DNA”) is hardly new.  The first patent on a gene was granted by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) two decades 
ago, in 1982.2  As biological research was advancing rapidly in the 
1980s, two trends combined to encourage the patenting and com-
mercialization of DNA:  the passage of pro-economic growth legisla-
tion and the emergence of the biotechnology industry.3  Since then, 
the PTO has granted over 40,000 patents on DNA,4 a practice that 
some say “challenge[s] [the] longstanding norms of sharing and 
openness” in biological research.5  Add to that concerns that DNA pa-
tents may stifle development in the name of commercial gain,6 offend  
the inherently personal nature of DNA, and raise bioethical dilem-
 
 * J.D. and Masters of Bioethics Candidate, 2012, University of Pennsylvania.  I would like to 
thank my advisor, Herbert Schwartz, Adjunct Professor at the University of Pennsylvania 
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 1 MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME:  THE CHALLENGE TO 
EQUALITY 105 (1998). 
 2 See U.S. Patent No. 4,322,499 (filed Dec. 22, 1978) (issued Mar. 30, 1982) (claiming a re-
combinant plasmid comprising the endorphin gene sequence). 
 3 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADEMIES, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND 
PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH 43–49 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
REAPING THE BENEFITS] (naming the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act and 
the Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980 as examples of pro-economic growth 
laws that helped incentivize the patenting of biological technology). 
 4 Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes?  Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 
19 (2011). 
 5 REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 44. 
 6 Id. at 25. 
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mas, and it becomes apparent why patents on DNA and genetic test-
ing methods (collectively, “DNA patents”)7 have remained so contro-
versial.8  Many advocates have even declared DNA to be common to 
the global human heritage.9 
The debate in the United States culminated recently in a high 
profile case, Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & 
Trademark Office (Myriad),10 in which the plaintiffs contested the pa-
tentability of two breast cancer genes and related genetic testing me-
thods.11  According to the National Cancer Institute, a woman born 
today in the United States has, on average, a 12.29% risk of develop-
ing breast cancer at some point in her lifetime.12  Genetic research by 
 
 7 In this Comment, I use the terminology “DNA patent” rather than “gene patent” because 
it more accurately reflects the various types of patents on DNA-related technology.  DNA 
patents may cover isolated genes, isolated DNA sequences, and genetic testing methods.  
Thus, the colloquial term “gene patent” is a misnomer when applied to the broad range 
of DNA-related patents.  See David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 152, 163 n.1 (2001) (highlighting the important terminology difference).  
Where I use the term “DNA patent” I am using the term broadly to refer to all the various 
types of DNA-related patents.  Where I am referring a subset of those patents, I will use 
other terms with facially obvious meanings, such as “patents on DNA molecules” or “pa-
tents on DNA testing methods.” 
 8 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz & John Sulston, Op-Ed., The Case Against Gene Patents, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 16, 2010, at A10 (arguing that DNA sequences, as naturally occurring molecules, 
should not be patentable); Who Owns Your Body?, WHOOWNSYOURBODY.ORG, 
http://www.whoownsyourbody.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (advocating against patent-
ing genes because of concerns about DNA ownership).  See generally Timothy Caulfield et 
al., Evidence and Anecdotes:  An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1091 (2006) (analyzing the motivations behind the “host of ethi-
cal, legal and economic concerns” surrounding DNA patenting). 
 9 See, e.g., Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
53/152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (Mar. 10, 1999) (viewing genes as belonging to the 
common heritage of mankind); Eur. Parl. Assoc., Protection of the Human Genome by the 
Council of Europe, 13th Sess., Recommendation 1512 (2001), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/EREC1512.htm (same); Press 
Release, World Medical Ass’n, World Medical Association Council Meeting (2000), available at 
http://www.wma.net/en/40news/20archives/2000/2000_16/index.html (same). 
 10 When referring to the Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office 
case in general, I will simply use its common short name, Myriad.  I will be more specific 
when referencing the separate decisions of the district court (Myriad I) and the Federal 
Circuit (Myriad II). 
 11 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 12 N. HOWLADER ET AL., NAT’L CANCER INST., SEER CANCER STATISTICS REVIEW, 1975–2008, 
at tbl.4.18, available at http://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2008/results_merged/
sect_04_breast.pdf; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F. 3d 
at 1339 (“The average woman in the United States has around a twelve to thirteen per-
cent risk of developing breast cancer in her lifetime.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 7, 
2011). 
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the defendants in Myriad, though, revealed a remarkable biological 
predictor:  women with mutations in two specific genes—BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 (collectively “BRCA”)—are at a significantly higher (50–80%) 
risk of developing breast cancer.13  This may seem like a boon for 
medical research, a breakthrough in humanity’s endeavor to conquer 
cancer.  The problem for some patients, though, was that they could 
not obtain BRCA genetic testing—through their insurance or at an 
affordable price—due to patent protection on the genes and screen-
ing methods.14  Doctors, researchers, and medical organizations also 
complained that their desire to provide BRCA genetic testing was 
hindered by fear of exposing themselves to potential patent litiga-
tion.15 
The Myriad case was closely watched, as it had the far-reaching po-
tential to block the patenting of DNA products and technologies.  In 
2010, to the surprise of many,16 the district court sided with the plain-
tiffs on grounds that DNA, even when isolated and purified, is a 
product of nature and thus not patentable subject matter.17  It was the 
first time any federal court found DNA patents to be invalid for in-
eligible subject matter.  But in a blow to critics of DNA patenting, the 
Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit reversed much of the district 
court’s decision the following year, holding that isolated and purified 
DNA molecules and certain DNA-related methods are indeed patent-
able subject matter.18 
The Myriad cases are also notable, though, because the plaintiffs 
asserted some interesting constitutional arguments against DNA pa-
tents—that they violate both the First Amendment and the Patent 
Clause of the Constitution.19  Under the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance,20 the district court declined to address these arguments 
 
 13 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339; see also Breast Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breast-cancer-risk-factors 
(last updated Sept. 29, 2011) (describing BRCA gene mutations, as well as other factors, 
as significant risk determinants of breast cancer). 
 14 Myriad II, 653 F.3d  at 1340. 
 15 Id. at 1341. 
 16 See, e.g., Sharon Begley, In Surprise Ruling, Court Declares Two Gene Patents Invalid, 
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2010, http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thehumancondition/
archive/2010/03/29/in-surprise-ruling-court-declares-two-gene-patents-invalid.aspx. 
 17 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220–37. 
 18 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1351. 
 19 See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38 (reviewing the claim that granting the Myriad pa-
tents violates the Constitution’s First Amendment, as well as Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8). 
 20 See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (“If there is 
one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudi-
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and reached only the issues rooted in patent doctrine.21  In this 
Comment, I pick up where the court left off by extending the legal 
analysis to possible constitutional challenges against DNA patents.  
The constitutional issues that DNA patents could potentially raise are 
worth exploring because of the far-reaching social equality and prop-
erty rights issues that genetic technologies pose.  Given that isolated 
and purified DNA has now been deemed patentable subject matter, 
the battleground for DNA patenting in the future may lie in constitu-
tional arguments.  And, at the least, a consideration of constitutional-
ity will deepen the existing debate on DNA patents. 
Part I provides some technical background and historical perspec-
tive on genetics and DNA patenting.  Part II examines possible consti-
tutional challenges to DNA patents and makes a determination as to 
whether any of them might prevail.  I focus in particular on the most 
controversial type of DNA patents—those that claim isolated and pu-
rified human DNA sequences.22  Part III then raises some issues that 
developing genetic technologies and DNA patents may present in the 
future. 
I conclude that constitutional challenges to DNA patents are un-
likely to succeed at this time, but, as social perceptions and access to 
the fruits of genetic research continue to evolve, constitutional argu-
ments could gain more traction in the future. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Structure of DNA 
In order to appreciate the nuances of DNA patents, a brief under-
standing of genetics is helpful.  DNA stores genetic information, the 
basis of inheritance,23 in nearly all organisms.24  In nature, it exists as a 
 
cation, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such ad-
judication is unavoidable.”). 
 21 See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38 (dismissing plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments 
under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance). 
 22 See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 
SCI. 239, 239 (2005) (“[The] gene patents that seem to cause the most controversy are 
those claiming human protein-encoding nucleotide sequences.”); see also text accompany-
ing notes 97–106. 
 23 Genes are defined as the “functional unit of inheritance.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY, http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmedsamp (search: “gene”) 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
 24 There are exceptions to this rule—some viruses have RNA rather than DNA as their ge-
netic material.  WILLIAM S. KLUG, MICHAEL R. CUMMINGS & CHARLOTTE A. SPENCER, 
CONCEPTS OF GENETICS 240–41 (8th ed. 2006). 
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double helix molecule comprised of nucleic acids that encode in-
structions for living cells to make proteins,25 which are necessary for 
structure and biological processes.26 
The building blocks of DNA are nucleotides, which consist of a 
sugar (deoxyribose), a phosphate, and a nitrogenous base.27  There 
are four nitrogenous bases—adenine (“A”), thymine (“T”), cytosine 
(“C”), and guanine (“G”)—often referred to as the genetic alphabet 
or genetic code.28  Nucleotides are named after the base that they 
contain and are linked by covalent sugar-phosphate bonds to form a 
polynucleotide chain, or DNA strand.29  As a double helix, a DNA mo-
lecule resembles a twisted ladder and contains two complementary 
DNA strands.30  The complementary pairing refers to the bases always 
pairing together, or hybridizing, in a complementary relationship—A 
with T, and C with G—to form the “rungs” of the ladder-like mole-
cule.31 
In vivo, DNA molecules are tightly packed into cell nuclei as 
chromosomes.32  Humans have twenty-three pairs of chromosomes:  
twenty-two pairs of autosomal chromosomes and one pair of sex 
chromosomes (either two X chromosomes in females, or one X and 
one Y chromosome in males).  Together, these chromosomes form 
the human genome, which contains an estimated 20,000–25,000 pro-
tein-encoding genes.33  Nearly all cells in the human body contain the 
entire genome, but different types of cells express different genes.34 
 
 25 DNA is first converted into ribonucleic acid, or RNA, and then translated into a protein 
product.  Id. at 6. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 5.  Without a phosphate, the subunit is called a nucleoside rather than a nucleotide.  
Id. at 241. 
 28 Id. at 5. 
 29 Id. at 241–44. 
 30 Id. at 5. 
 31 Id. at 5, 241. 
 32 Id. at 20–22.  If unwound and stretched out linearly, the DNA in each somatic (diploid) 
human cell would be approximately two meters long, and all the DNA in one individual 
would stretch to and from the sun more than three hundred times.  Anthony T. Annun-
ziato, DNA Packaging:  Nucleosomes and Chromatin, 1 NATURE EDUC. (2008), available at 
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/dna-packaging-nucleosomes-and-chromatin-
310. 
 33 How Many Genes Are in the Human Genome?, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/genenumber.shtml (last 
modified Sept. 19, 2008). 
 34 KLUG, CUMMINGS & SPENCER, supra note 24, at 412–13. 
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B.  The Role of Genes 
A gene is difficult to define because it gives rise to both scientific 
and abstract notions.35  Biologically, it is a segment of DNA, anywhere 
from a few nucleotides to several thousand nucleotides long, that 
codes for a specific protein.  If nucleotides are roughly analogous to 
letters of the alphabet, then genes would be words, chromosomes 
would be paragraphs, and genomes would be entire passages.  A gene 
contains regions that can be identified as introns, or intervening se-
quences that do not code for any protein; all other regions are exons, 
or essential portions that code for a protein.36  Proteins, in turn, “are 
responsible for imparting the properties that we attribute to living 
systems.”37  There are a wide range of proteins, including enzymes, 
hormones, structural molecules, connective tissues, and antibodies.38  
The process of going from DNA to its end product, protein, is called 
gene expression and involves two main steps:  (1) transcription and 
(2) translation.39 
During transcription, the DNA molecule is unwound and tran-
scribed into a different type of nucleic acid, ribonucleic acid 
(“RNA”).  RNA is similar to DNA, except that its nucleotide backbone 
consists of the ribose, rather than deoxyribose, sugar, and it contains 
the base uracil (“U”) rather than T.40  The non-coding strand of DNA 
is used as a template to form a pre-RNA molecule, which has exactly 
the complementary base sequence.41  The pre-RNA molecule is then 
spliced to remove all the unnecessary regions, or introns.42  The re-
sulting RNA molecule, containing only exons, is called messenger 
RNA (“mRNA”).43 
After transcription, an mRNA molecule is converted into a pro-
tein in a process called translation.  Each triplet of nucleotides on an 
mRNA molecule is called a codon and codes for one of twenty amino 
acids, the building blocks of proteins.44  A transfer RNA (“tRNA”) at-
taches to the mRNA, interprets a codon, directs the corresponding 
amino acid to be added to a growing polypeptide, then continues 
 
 35 Rogers, supra note 4, at 21–22 (discussing the challenge of defining “genes”). 
 36 KLUG, CUMMINGS & SPENCER, supra note 24, at 323. 
 37 Id. at 6. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 5–6. 
 40 Id. at 241. 
 41 Id. at 320.  For example, a non-coding DNA sequence of AGTCAAT would be transcribed 
into an RNA molecule with a sequence of UCAGUUA. 
 42 Id. at 323. 
 43 Id. at 308, 320, 323. 
 44 Id. at 307–08. 
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down the mRNA until the entire sequence has been translated into a 
complete protein.45 
Finally, a mutation refers to a change of base in a DNA sequence, 
which may or may not result in the sequence encoding a different po-
lypeptide product.46  Gene mutations are frequently responsible for 
biological abnormalities and genetic diseases. 
C.  Advances in Biotechnology 
For several decades now, scientists have been able to identify, 
study, and manipulate DNA molecules for medical applications.  
“DNA sequencing” or “gene sequencing” refers to the process of de-
termining the precise order of bases in a DNA segment or gene.47  
Scientists are also able to synthesize DNA sequences in vitro.  One 
common method of doing so is to use mRNA as a template to create 
complementary DNA (“cDNA”) in a type of reverse-transcription 
process.  Such cDNA has the advantage of not having any introns, as 
it is created from intron-free mRNA.48 
Short DNA molecules, usually eighteen to twenty-two base pairs 
long,49 can be useful as probes or primers in genetic research.  They 
can identify target DNA sequences by annealing, or complementarily 
binding, to DNA molecules.  Scientists have also developed various 
methods for DNA sequencing and genetic diagnostic testing, advanc-
ing our ability to treat genetic diseases.  More than one thousand ge-
netic diseases can now be diagnosed with genetic tests, and most of 
the associated genes have been patented.50  In fact, nearly 20% of all 
human genes have been explicitly claimed in patents,51 including 
those associated with obesity, diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, and vari-
ous cancers.52 
 
 45 Id. at 335–36. 
 46 The reason a mutation may not materially change the polypeptide product that a DNA 
sequence encodes is because several different codons may code for the same amino acid.  
In other words, there is redundancy, or degeneracy, in the genetic code.  See id. at 312–
14. 
 47 Id. at 110, 477. 
 48 Id. at 469. 
 49 PCR Primer Design Guidelines, PREMIER BIOSOFT, http://www.premierbiosoft.com/
tech_notes/PCR_Primer_Design.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
 50 REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 68. 
 51 Jensen & Murray, supra note 22. 
 52 Id. at 240; Selene Kaye, Who Owns Your Genes?, AM. C.L. UNION BLOG RTS. (May 12, 2009, 
7:45 PM), http://www.aclu.org/2009/05/12/who-owns-your-genes. 
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D.  DNA Patenting 
1.  The Patentability of DNA Under Patent Law 
Under § 101 of the Patent Act, “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter” is patentable.53  This 
language has been construed broadly by the Supreme Court54 to en-
compass “anything under the sun that is made by man.”55  However, 
there are limitations to patentable subject matter in the form of three 
judicially created exceptions to § 101:  “laws of nature, physical phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas.”56  “The concepts covered by these ex-
ceptions are ‘part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free 
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”57 
Although natural phenomena are not patentable subject matter, 
patent eligibility may arise when a natural compound has been iso-
lated and purified through human intervention to become a sub-
stance different in kind from the natural product.58  In 1980, the Su-
preme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that hybrid 
microorganisms made through genetic engineering are patentable 
because, despite their living status, they are man-made and the 
“product of human ingenuity.”59  Under this legal framework, the 
 
 53 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 54 The Court recently reaffirmed that “[i]n choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by 
the  comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be 
given wide scope.”  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)). 
 55 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 & n.6 (citations omitted). 
 56 Id. at 309; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (describing the exceptions 
as precluding patenting of “phenomena of nature,” “mental processes,” and “abstract in-
tellectual concepts”).  The Supreme Court, over the years, has given numerous examples 
of subject matter that is not patentable.  See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 
(1978) (finding mathematical algorithm applied to catalytic convertors to be a law of na-
ture and not patent eligible); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–73 (holding that numerical con-
version algorithm is an abstract idea and not patentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo In-
oculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (ruling that a mixture of naturally-occurring 
bacteria is a natural phenomena and not patentable).  But see Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. 
Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding that a natural substance is pa-
tent eligible if it is purified and given commercial or therapeutic qualities), aff’d in rele-
vant part 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 57 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130). 
 58 See Parke-Davis & Co., 189 F. at 103 (finding purified adrenaline to be patent eligible be-
cause it was “for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically”); 
Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1910) (holding 
purified aspirin to be patent eligible because, unlike less purified aspirin, it was “practical-
ly effective and safe”). 
 59 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (holding that man-made products of genetic engineering are 
patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
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PTO has been issuing patents on isolated and purified gene se-
quences since 1982.60 
In 2001, the PTO published a revised set of examination proce-
dures related to the “utility,” or usefulness, requirement61 for paten-
tability and reiterated its position that DNA is patentable.62  It stated 
that DNA that has been “isolated” and “purified” from its natural 
state is patentable “because that DNA molecule does not occur in 
that isolated form in nature.”63 
2.  An Overview of the DNA Patenting Controversy 
The patenting of DNA products and genetic methods has been 
bitterly disputed.64  While the BRCA genes and related litigation are 
the most controversial DNA patenting topic to date,65 there have been 
several other high profile DNA patenting controversies.  For instance, 
there was widespread opposition to an attempt by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) in the 1990s to patent more than two-
thousand expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”)—short segments of 
cDNA useful in gene discovery and gene sequencing.66  Similarly, Mi-
ami Children’s Hospital—holder of the gene patent for Canavan syn-
drome (a rare and fatal neurological disease)—caused an uproar 
when it decided to charge a $12.50 royalty per test for the disease.67  
 
 60 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,322,499 (filed Dec. 22, 1978) (issued Mar. 30, 1982). 
 61 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (indicating that the utility require-
ment to patentability in 35 U.S.C. § 101 has been interpreted to entail “substantial” and 
“specific benefit”). 
 62 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 63 Id. at 1093. 
 64 See Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1091–94 (investigating the reasons behind common 
concerns about DNA patenting); Resnik, supra note 7, at 152 (analyzing the basis behind 
arguments that DNA patenting threatens human dignity); see also supra note 9 and ac-
companying text.  Popular media, including novels, have also taken sides in the contro-
versy.  See, e.g., MICHAEL CRICHTON, NEXT (2006) (using a mix of fiction and non-fiction 
in a novel about a world dominated by genetic research and corporate greed in order to 
advocate for a ban on DNA patenting). 
 65 See Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1093 fig.2 (comparing the number of references to 
various controversial biotechnology patents). 
 66 See Gert Matthijs & Gert-Jan B. Van Ommen, Gene Patents:  From Discovery to Invention:  A 
Geneticist’s View, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS:  PATENT 
POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 311, 311–12 
(Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009) (describing the scientific community’s generally neg-
ative reaction to NIH’s attempt to patent ESTs).  For general background on the contro-
versy around patenting expressed sequence tags, see Daniel J. Kevles & Arie Berkowitz, 
The Gene Patenting Controversy:  A Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 233, 236–37 (2001). 
 67 See Tom Reynolds, Gene Patent Race Speeds Ahead Amid Controversy, Concern, 92 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 184, 186 (2000), available at http://jnci.oxfordjournals.org/content/
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Critics are often concerned that DNA patenting may inhibit scientific 
and medical progress.  Specifically, they argue that:  (1) on balance, 
patented DNA sequences may stall rather than promote medical re-
search because of DNA’s fundamental role in downstream research; 
and (2) patent-protected genetic tests may not be readily accessible 
due to licensing restrictions.68  Some are also worried that DNA pa-
tents unethically treat humans as marketable commodities and 
threaten human dignity.69  Still others maintain that genetic material 
should not be patentable because it is common to all humanity70 and 
not created by man.71 
 
92/3/184.full; see also Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1091 (mentioning the “furor” 
caused by the NIH and Canavan DNA patenting controversies). 
 68 See Rogers, supra note 4, at 19–20 (“The advent of human gene patents frightened many 
people who feared:  1) inhibition of scientific research, the development of medical ther-
apies and follow-on technologies; 2) unreasonable costs for genetic tests, lower quality 
genetic tests, or worse the exclusion of genetic tests from patients; and 3) stealing of pub-
licly funded research by corporations.”); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 
698–701 (1998) (discussing a scenario where researchers underuse scarce biomedical re-
sources because too many owners can block each other); Lori Andrews & Jordan Para-
dise, Genetic Sequence Patents:  Historical Justification and Current Impacts, 35–36 (2009), 
available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1632539_code512260.pdf?abstractid
=1632539 (making legal arguments against DNA patents); Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Pa-
tent the Genome:  Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the Future of Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 241–46 (2003) (noting that gene patents are contrary to the un-
derlying intent of the Patent Act and that traditional economic analysis does not support 
the application of the patent system to genes).  For a discussion of patent protection’s 
impact on research and access, see supra Part II.A. 
 69 See generally Resnik, supra note 7, at 163 (describing the threat that DNA patenting may 
pose to human dignity). 
 70 See, e.g., Position Statement on Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing, AM. COLL. OF MED. 
GENETICS (Aug. 2, 1999), http://www.acmg.net/StaticContent/StaticPages/Gene_
Patents.pdf; Bartha Maria Knoppers, Commentary, Status, Sale, and Patenting of Human 
Genetic Material:  An International Survey, 22 NATURE GENETICS 23, 23 (1999) (relaying that 
the human genome “can be defined at the universal level, the family level, and the indi-
vidual level” and “definitive legal recognition of the human genome as common heritage 
has not been formalized. . . . In contrast to the hesitancy to adopt the notion of the uni-
versal, ‘collective’ human genome, the ‘familial’ nature of genetic material and informa-
tion is slowly gaining acceptance,” especially at the international level.). 
 71 For example, in 1995, the leaders of more than eighty various religious faiths and deno-
minations signed a joint statement, declaring:  “We, the undersigned religious leaders, 
oppose the patenting of human and animal life forms. . . . We believe that humans and 
animals are creations of God, not humans, and as such should not be patented as human 
inventions.”  Press Release, Gen. Bd. of Church & Soc’y of the United Methodist Church, 
Joint Appeal Against Human and Animal Patenting (May 1995), in AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, 
UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES:  RELIGIOUS ETHICS AT THE FRONTIERS OF GENETIC SCIENCE 125 
(1999). 
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Courts in the United States, though, do not conduct moral or eth-
ical inquiries, leaving that task instead to the legislature’s lawmak-
ing.72  As such, this Comment will address the issues surrounding 
DNA patents through a legal analysis, setting aside ethical issues.73 
3.  The Myriad Decisions 
The debate over DNA patenting culminated recently in the closely 
watched74 Myriad I and Myriad II cases.  The high profile litigation 
brought the topic of DNA patenting into the spotlight, prompting 
several organizations, both domestically75 and abroad,76 to publish re-
ports with policy recommendations.77 
 
 
 72 Resnik, supra note 7, at 153.  
 73 For a discussion of ethical issues, see, for example, Resnik, supra note 7.  Resnik’s scholar-
ship finds that human DNA patenting does not “violate” human dignity but may “threaten” 
it because DNA patenting may “play[] a role in the trend toward commodification of the 
body.”  Id. at 163. 
 74 One review of DNA patenting controversies rated the Myriad case “the most referenced 
patent controversy in . . . policy documents.”  Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1091. 
 75 For example, the National Academy of Sciences has recommended a research exemption 
for DNA patenting to address the purported anticommons and restricted access prob-
lems.  See REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 145. 
 76 For example, in the United Kingdom, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommended 
that the scope of patent rights over naturally occurring DNA and DNA as research tools 
should be limited and discouraged, respectively.  NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE 
ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA:  A DISCUSSION PAPER 71–74 (2002), available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/The%20ethics%20of%20patenting
%20DNA%20a%20discussion%20paper.pdf; see also DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS, 
PATENTING HUMAN GENES AND STEM CELLS (2004), available at http://etiskraad.dk/~/
media/publications-en/stem-cell-research/patenting-human-genes-and-stem-cells-
2004.ashx. 
 77 Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1093 (“[Our] survey of policy reports reveals that the My-
riad Genetics controversy was used as a primary tool for justifying patent reform . . . .”).  
Belgium has adopted a broad research exemption and a compulsory licensing system, 
“largely inspired” by Myriad’s restrictive licensing policy.  GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE & 
ESTHER VAN ZIMMEREN, RESHAPING BELGIAN PATENT LAW:  THE REVISION OF THE 
RESEARCH EXEMPTION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR PUBLIC 
HEALTH 2 (2006), available at http://www.iip.or.jp/e/e_publication/pdf/vol64_overwalle
_and_zimmeren.pdf.  France has adopted Directive 98/44, aimed at limiting the scope of 
patent claims on DNA molecules more so than other European countries.  See Jacques 
Warcoin, ‘Patent Tsunami’ in the Field of Genetic Diagnostics:  A Patent Practitioner’s View, in 
GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS:  PATENT POOLS, 
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES, supra note 67, at 331, 
333–35. 
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a.  Background on the Myriad Case 
At issue in the Myriad case were fifteen claims from seven patents, 
all relating to the two BRCA genes:  claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 20 of U.S. 
Patent 5,747,282; claims 1, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent 5,837,492; claim 1 
of U.S. Patent 5,693,473; claim 1 of U.S. Patent 5,709,999; claim 1 of 
U.S. Patent 5,710,001; claim 1 of U.S. Patent 5,753,441; and claims 1 
and 2 of U.S. Patent 6,033,857.78  All of the claims were related to two 
human breast cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2.79  Using positional 
cloning techniques, the inventors found that mutations in the BRCA 
genes correlate with a significantly increased risk of ovarian and 
breast cancer.80 
The plaintiffs-appellees in Myriad included professors, genetic 
counselors, breast cancer patients, and private organizations dedicat-
ed to the interests of geneticists, pathologists, and breast cancer pa-
tients.81  Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), they filed suit against the PTO, Myriad Genetics (“My-
riad”), and the directors of the University of Utah Research Founda-
tion, arguing that the DNA patents at issue covered invalid subject 
matter under § 101 because the BRCA genes fell within the products-
of-nature exception to patentability.82  A threshold issue arose as to 
whether the plaintiffs had proper standing to bring the lawsuit, but 
this Comment will focus on the matters of patentability that arose af-
ter the courts resolved the standing issue.83 
 
 78 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 79 Id. 
 80 While the average risk of an American woman developing breast cancer in her lifetime is 
12–13%, a woman with BRCA mutations is at a 50–80% risk of developing breast cancer 
and a 20–50% risk of developing ovarian cancer.  Id. at 1339. 
 81 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 186–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part 653 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 82 Id. at 183–84. 
83 Briefly, the standing issue arose because the plaintiffs-appellees were seeking a declarato-
ry judgment when it was not clear whether the action satisfied the case-or-controversy re-
quirement of Article III.  Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1341.  Two of the plaintiffs-appellees, Drs. 
Kazazian and Ganguly, were the co-directors of the University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic 
Diagnostic Laboratory who had stopped providing BRCA diagnostic services to women af-
ter receiving cease-and-desist letters from Myriad.  Id. at 1339–40.  They alleged that, if it 
were not for the threat of patent infringement litigation, they would have “the personnel, 
expertise, and facilities as well as the desire” to provide such diagnostic services again.  Id. 
at 1340–41.  Another plaintiff-appellee, Dr. Ostrer, was forced to send patient samples for 
BRCA testing to Myriad after the University of Pennsylvania stopped performing the tests.  
Id. at 1340.  He claimed that he “would immediately begin to perform BRCA1/2-related 
genetic testing upon invalidation of the Myriad patents.”  Id. at 1341 (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The defendants-appellants asserted that the plain-
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The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed an amicus brief in the 
case on October 29, 2010 that partially reversed the government’s 
stance on DNA patentability.84  The amicus brief made a distinction, 
on the one hand, between DNA that is isolated and altered, and, on 
the other hand, DNA that has simply been isolated.85  It argued that 
isolated and altered DNA should be patentable, whereas DNA that is 
simply isolated should not be patentable, even though “this conclu-
sion is contrary to the longstanding practice of the [PTO], as well as 
the practice of the NIH and other government agencies.”86  The PTO 
did not sign off on the amicus brief, so its opinion of the DOJ’s brief 
is unclear.87  However, as Judge Bryson pointed out in his dissenting 
opinion in Myriad II, the PTO is, after all, under the auspices of the 
DOJ.88  Therefore, it could be “fair to assume that the Executive 
Branch has modified its position from the one taken by the PTO in 
its 2001 guidelines and, informally, before that.”89 
 
tiffs-appellees had no adverse legal interests and had not alleged any “controversy of suf-
ficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”  Id. at 
1343.  The lower court disagreed, finding standing for all the plaintiff researchers under 
the “all the circumstances” test of MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 
(2007), because they were “ready, willing, and able” to begin BRCA gene testing.  Myriad 
I, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 386, 390–91.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and re-
versed in part on the standing issue, finding that Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly did not have 
standing but that Dr. Ostrer did.  Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1348 (“Simply disagreeing with 
the existence of a patent or even suffering an attenuated, nonproximate, effect from the 
existence of a patent does not meet the Supreme Court’s requirement for an adverse le-
gal controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declarato-
ry judgment.”) (referencing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127). 
 84 Andrew Pollack, U.S. Says Genes Should Not Be Eligible for Patenting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/30drug.html.  The DOJ is not the 
only government agency that has recently reconsidered its stance on DNA patenting.  For 
example, in 2002, a Canadian government report suggested reforms to strengthen the re-
search exemption and loosen the compulsory licensing provisions in Canada’s patent laws 
to allow for less restrictions on genetic diagnostic and screening tests.  See GOV’T OF 
ONTARIO, ONTARIO REPORT TO THE PREMIERS:  GENETICS, TESTING & GENE PATENTING:  
CHARTING NEW TERRITORY IN HEALTHCARE 45–52 (2002) (recommending development 
of new policies and training on gene patents within the Canadian Intellectual Property 
Office and suggesting certain amendments to the Canadian Patent Act). 
 85 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4, Myriad II, 653 
F.3d 1329 (No. 09-CV-4515). 
 86 Id. at 17–18. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1380–81 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 89 Id. 
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b.  The Current Validity of DNA Patenting After the Myriad 
Cases 
In Myriad I, Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York held 
the patents on the BRCA genes to be invalid.  The lower court’s deci-
sion was surprising, as no court had ever before found DNA patents 
invalid.90  The district court viewed the BRCA genes as products of na-
ture and thus found that the patents covered ineligible subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.91 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the patentability of DNA 
subject matter in detail and overturned much of the district court’s 
ruling in a 1-1-1 split decision.92  It found that DNA molecules “that 
human intervention has given markedly different, or distinctive, cha-
racteristics” are patentable and so are related methods, as long as 
they claim more than simply analyzing or comparing DNA mole-
cules.93 
The judges in Myriad II made distinctions between the three types 
of DNA patents at issue:  (1) composition claims covering isolated 
gene sequences; (2) method claims covering “analyzing” or “compar-
ing” normal sequences with mutated sequences; and (3) method 
claims covering more than merely “analyzing” or “comparing” se-
quences.94  All three judges agreed in separately authored opinions 
that method claims for “analyzing” or “comparing” DNA sequences 
are not patentable subject matter because they are overly broad for 
claiming “only abstract mental processes.”95  On the other hand, they 
found that any method claims going beyond merely analyzing or com-
paring DNA sequences are protectable by the Patent Act because they 
cover potentially valuable inventive methods.96 
 
 90 See Begley, supra note 16 (describing the prevailing expectation of the legal community 
that the DNA patents at issue in Myriad would be upheld). 
 91 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 220–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for 
cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 92 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1333, 1358, 1373. 
 93 Id. at 1351–52 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 Id. at 1334–35. 
 95 Id. at 1355–57; id. at 1358 (Moore, J., concurring in part); id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 96 Id. at 1358; id. at 1358 (Moore, J., concurring in part); id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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However, the composition claims at issue proved much more divi-
sive for the court.97  Judge Lourie’s opinion for the court, with which 
Judge Moore concurred, found that all isolated DNA molecules are 
patentable, regardless of sequence length, because the covalent 
bonds at the ends of a DNA molecule, when isolated, must be bro-
ken, making the molecule a “distinct chemical entity” that is by defi-
nition “markedly different” from any DNA molecules existing in na-
ture.98  Judge Lourie was careful to note, however, that “isolated DNA 
is not purified DNA.”99  Purification, which “makes pure what was 
 . . . previously impure,” is distinct from the chemical manipulation of 
the isolation process and is not the deciding factor of patentability for 
DNA molecules.100 
Judge Bryson disagreed with the plurality’s view on the patentabil-
ity of composition claims covering isolated DNA molecules.101  He fo-
cused on the “material[ity of] change made to genes from their natu-
ral state,” rather than the chemical alterations.102  From such a 
vantage point, he agreed with Judges Lourie and Moore to the extent 
that a cDNA molecule that cannot be found naturally in cells should 
be patentable subject matter.103  A cDNA molecule must be synthe-
sized by man from mRNA and, as such, is arguably distinct from any 
native DNA because it has no introns.104  However, an isolated gene in 
its entirety should not be patentable, Judge Bryson argued, because, 
though the ends of the DNA molecule are slightly altered chemically, 
an isolated gene is not a “new” entity in genetic terms; instead, it 
codes for the same protein as the naturally occurring gene.105 
Therefore, the judges in Myriad II agreed (though their reasoning 
was different) that cDNA molecules are patentable, as are method 
claims that go beyond simply “analyzing” or “comparing” DNA se-
quences.  They diverged, though, on the patentability of isolated 
DNA molecules that, except for isolation, can be found as native 
DNA.  Not only are patents on isolated DNA molecules the most con-
troversial, but they also “confer[] the broadest protection . . . because 
 
 97 See id. at 1349–55 (opinion for the court) (finding the composition claims protectable); 
id. at 1364–73 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (same); id. at 1375–79 (Bryson, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (finding the composition claims non-protectable). 
 98 Id. at 1351 (opinion for the court). 
 99 Id. at 1352. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
102 Id. at 1375. 
103 Id. at 1378–79. 
104 Id. at 1379. 
105 Id. at 1376–77. 
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the claimed molecule will fall within the scope of the patent regard-
less of what process is used to make the product.”106 
The case gained a lot of publicity107 because the lower court’s deci-
sion had marked the first time a federal court invalidated any patent 
on an isolated gene.  The case was also interesting, though, because 
the plaintiffs raised constitutional arguments, in addition to statutory 
ones, in support of invalidation.108  The plaintiffs presented argu-
ments against DNA patentability under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the U.S. Constitution (the “Patent Clause”) and the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution.109  Under the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance,110 the district court sidestepped the constitutional issues 
raised by the plaintiffs.111 
While constitutional challenges have been raised previously in 
other patent contexts112 and are not uncommon,113 no court has yet 
analyzed the constitutionality of DNA patents.  Thus, an interesting 
question arises:  assuming DNA patents are valid under the Chakrabar-
ty framework and statutory requirements, is there something funda-
mentally unique about them that would nonetheless make them un-
constitutional?  To examine this question, this Comment will set aside 
statutory arguments, as well as ethical concerns. 
 
106 Hill, supra note 68, at 233. 
107 See, e.g., John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer Genes Cannot Be Patented, U.S. Judge Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at B1; Susan Decker & Thom Weidlich, Myriad Loses Ruling 
Over Breast Cancer-Gene Patents (Update 3), BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=a72pJ28MwB5c&pid=newsarchive (last vi-
sited Nov. 23, 2011); David Ewing Duncan, Is the DNA Patent Dead?, CNNMONEY (Mar. 30, 
2011, 4:11 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2010/03/30/is-the-dna-patent-dead. 
108 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 32–37, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS)), 2009 WL 3269113. 
109 Id. 
110 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947) (listing grounds 
supporting the doctrine of constitutional avoidance); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Val-
ley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Considerations of pro-
priety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the 
constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance 
of our judicial function . . . .” (internal quotation marks ommitted)). 
111 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 237–38 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for 
cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 7, 2011). 
112 For example, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in Bilski v. Kappos, arguing that granting 
patents on business methods would risk violating the First Amendment.  Brief for Amicus 
Curiae American Civil Liberties Union for Affirmance in Support of Appellee, In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2007-1130), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
pdfs/freespeech/in_re_bilski_aclu_amicus.pdf. 
113 “It is not that unusual to invoke the Constitution in patent cases.”  Carter v. ALK Hold-
ings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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This Comment assumes, pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s Myriad 
II decision, that genes are patentable as a matter of patent doctrine.  
As such, it will not treat the issue of patentable subject matter as a 
separate constitutional issue.114 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA PATENTS 
Constitutional protections only apply to the government, not pri-
vate entities or individuals (the “state action” doctrine).115  Therefore, 
any constitutional challenge to DNA patents would necessarily have 
to involve the government as a party.116  Occasionally, private action 
may also be considered government action, but this area of the law is 
unsettled and outside the scope of this Comment.117 
 
114 The Patent Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  One commentator has posited that 
the term “useful Arts” may provide constitutional grounds for the subject matter limita-
tion in 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated what constitu-
tional grounds, if any, exist.  Edward C. Walterscheid, “Within the Limits of the Constitutional 
Grant”:  Constitutional Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 348–49 
(2002).  While “there are clearly constitutional requirements that must be met in setting 
standards of patentability, the nature of any constitutional restrictions on patentable sub-
ject matter is less clear.”  Id. at 292. 
115 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (holding that, under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress lacks power to regulate private conduct).  There are some 
exceptions to the “state action” rule.  For example, the Thirteenth Amendment applies 
directly to private conduct to bar slavery.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
POLICY AND PRINCIPLES 509 (3d ed. 2006).  Also, Congress can enact laws that require pri-
vate conduct to meet constitutional standards.  Id. 
116 “[W]here . . . the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of 
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority 
of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for pur-
poses of the First Amendment.”  Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397–
400 (1995) (holding that Amtrak, created by federal law with a board appointed by the 
President and ultimately managed by the government, must comply with the Constitu-
tion). 
117 There are two general exceptions to the state action doctrine.  The first exception is the 
“public function exception,” when a private entity is performing a task traditionally and 
exclusively done by the government.  See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345, 352 (1974) (explaining the “public function exception”).  The second is the “entan-
glement exception,” requiring private conduct to comply with the Constitution if the 
government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional conduct.  See 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of dis-
criminatory covenants constituted state action in violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 (“It surely cannot be that 
government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the 
Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form.”). 
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According to data through 2008, U.S. government institutions 
own 47,220 U.S. patents.118  Of these, more than 900 are DNA-
based,119 making the U.S. government the second largest domestic 
holder of DNA patents, behind only the University of California.120  
When the federal government funds research at universities or insti-
tutions, the funding agreement usually specifies how patent rights 
will be allocated.121  Most of the time, the research entity is the owner 
of the patent, but the government may retain licensing rights.122 
In this Part, I consider four possible constitutional challenges to 
DNA patents based on:  (1) the Patent Clause; (2) fundamental 
rights; (3) the First Amendment; and (4) the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  The independent success of any one of the argu-
ments could be enough to deem specific DNA patents unconstitu-
tional, though, as I discuss below, their reach is limited and likelih-
ood of success is low. 
A.  The Patent Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8) 
While the Constitution grants broad authority to Congress to 
enact patent statutes,123 this authority is not absolute.124  Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution (the “Patent Clause”) contains 
some of the requirements of patentability.  As interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, the Patent Clause precludes “the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public do-
 
118 PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING TEAM, USPTO, UTILITY PATENTS ASSIGNED TO U.S. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969–2008, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/govt/asgn/table_1_gov.htm. 
119 See REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 104 fig.4-2. 
120 Id. 
121 Herbert J. Zeh, Jr., The Federal Funding of R&D:  Who Gets the Patent Rights?, JOM, Apr. 
1990, at 69, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-
9004.html. 
122 Id.  The Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006), enacted in 1980, it allows institu-
tions and organizations receiving federal research funding to pursue patent rights, sub-
ject to certain conditions, including granting the U.S. government a “nonexclusive, non-
transferable, irrevocable, paid-up license” to the invention.  37 C.F.R. § 401.14(b) (2009). 
123 The most recent example of Congress’s constitutional power to enact patent statutes is 
the America Invents Act, passed by Congress in 2011.  This Act will switch the PTO’s “first-
to-invent” system to a “first-inventor-to-file” system, similar to what most other countries 
currently use.  Its other goals are to reduce patent disputes that bog down the courts and 
to allow the PTO to set and retain its own patent prosecution fees.  See David Goldman, 
Patent Reform Is Finally on Its Way, CNNMONEY (June 24, 2011, 11:05 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/24/technology/patent_reform_bill/index.htm?iid=EA
L (explaining the changes to patent law made by the America Invents Act). 
124 Walterscheid, supra note 114, at 292; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 
(1966) (“[The Patent Clause] is both a grant of power and a limitation.”). 
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main, or to restrict free access to materials already [publicly] availa-
ble.”125  While patents give a patent holder exclusivity rights for a li-
mited period of time, a primary justification for patent protection is 
to advance the progress of the arts by incentivizing innovation and 
disclosure.126  Others can then improve or expand upon the public 
knowledge and continue making scientific progress. 
Genes are, typically, not the ends but the means to progress in ge-
netic research.  Put another way, DNA molecules are usually the sub-
ject of further research.127  Because DNA patents often claim this most 
basic level of biological research, they can be considered “upstream” 
inventions, or discoveries which require considerably more “refine-
ment and investment” before reaching a commercial product.128  
Many DNA patents even claim analogs, or similar DNA sequences 
that all code for the same protein end product.129  Patents on up-
stream inventions like DNA sequences may be creating a chilling ef-
fect on research:  “[T]he growing number of patents on research in-
puts may now impede . . . research by creating an ‘anticommons’ in 
which rights holders may impose excessive transaction costs or make 
the acquisition of licenses . . . too burdensome to permit the pursuit 
of scientifically and socially worthwhile research.”130  There is concern 
that owners of upstream discoveries may limit follow-up research, as 
potential financial gains from upstream research may make research-
ers hesitant about sharing research findings.131 
The plaintiffs in Myriad voiced this concern in the context of the 
Patent Clause.  They argued that the BRCA patents are unconstitu-
 
125 Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.  Another judicially read limitation of the Patent Clause is the fully 
enabling disclosure, which acts as consideration for an exclusive patent right.  Walter-
scheid, supra note 114, at 300–01.  In addition, novelty is a constitutional requirement.  
Id. at 359 (“Clearly, if a discovery is not new, it does not promote [the progress of science 
and the arts].”). 
126 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights and Expe-
rimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–30 (1989). 
127 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 108, at 35–37 (arguing that “a genetic sequence is biological information itself” 
and thus not properly patentable (emphasis in original)). 
128 See REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 22. 
129 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 211–14 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents-in-suit as claiming the wild-
type genes, as well as mutated versions and short segments of the genes), rev’d in part and 
aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 7, 2011). 
130 John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench:  Patents and Material 
Transfers, 309 SCI. & L. 2002, 2002 (2005) (footnotes omitted); see also Heller & Eisenberg, 
supra note 68, at 698–99 (using the term “tragedy of the anticommons” to describe the 
“obstacles” that upstream patents may impose on biomedical research). 
131 Walsh, Cho & Cohen, supra note 130. 
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tional because the Patent Clause necessarily prohibits patents that 
impede, rather than promote, the progress of science and the useful 
arts.132  For example, several of the claims at issue in Myriad cover iso-
lated, but otherwise unmodified, human DNA.  The district court 
identified claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (“the ‘282 patent”) as 
representative of this category of challenged claims:  “An isolated 
DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the 
amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.”133  Accordingly, claim 
1 of the ‘282 patent includes any isolated DNA molecule that codes 
for the naturally occurring BRCA1 protein; except for isolation, the 
claimed DNA is structurally identical to the DNA segment that occurs 
in the human body.  The plaintiffs in Myriad alleged that Myriad’s en-
forcement of its patents prevents anyone without a license from using 
or synthesizing the BRCA genes, thus stifling valuable research.134  In 
the same vein, the ACLU has taken the position that patents on ge-
netic material “slow scientific advancement[] because there is no way 
to invent around a gene—the gene is the basis for all subsequent re-
search.”135 
But the net effect of upstream patents on research is far from 
clear.  As the National Research Council of the National Academies 
summarizes: 
Awarding patents for [upstream] inventions may offer the possibility for 
the inventor to participate in any financial benefit that might result from 
the use of his or her discovery in the development of a drug or other use-
ful product.  On the other hand, such upstream patents could be broadly 
enabling in many different areas of basic research, and, if kept as a trade 
secret by a single company or exclusively licensed to one or very few 
companies they could stymie scientists more broadly in their pursuit of 
 
132 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 108, at 37–38. 
133 U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, col.153 ll.56–58 (filed June 7, 1995); see Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2011).  Similarly, another of the defendants’ patents, U.S. Patent No. 
5,837,492 (“the ‘492 patent”), claimed the isolated DNA molecule coding for the BRCA2 
protein.  See U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, col.167 ll.16–19 (filed Apr. 29, 1996) (claiming 
“[a]n isolated DNA molecule coding for a BRCA2 polypeptide, said DNA molecule com-
prising a nucleic acid sequence encoding the amino acid sequence . . . .”).  The plaintiffs’ 
arguments pertaining to the ‘282 patent also applied to the ‘492 argument. 
134 The defendants-appellants in Myriad sent cease and desist letters to plaintiff-appellee re-
searchers and doctors who used portions of the BRCA genes for patient breast cancer 
screening.  Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 204–05.  The Madey v. Duke decision of 2002, 
though, “raised anew the question of the impact of research tool patents on biomedical 
research by clarifying that there was no general research exemption shielding academic 
researchers from infringement liability.”  Walsh, Cho & Cohen, supra note 130 (footnote 
omitted). 
135 Selene Kaye, Why Gene Patents Are Unlawful, AM. C.L. UNION BLOG RTS. (May 22, 2009, 
11:46 AM), http://www.aclu.org/2009/05/22/why-gene-patents-are-unlawful. 
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basic knowledge.  Patenting these upstream inventions has the advan-
tage, therefore, of assuring universal access if licensed broadly.  However, 
given the unique nature of human genes and the crystalline structures of 
human proteins, scientists may find it difficult or impossible to “invent 
around” the subject matter if patented and if the patent can be en-
forced . . . .136 
Many studies have been conducted to clarify the effect of DNA pa-
tenting on downstream research.  There is some evidence showing 
that “researchers are becoming more secretive and less willing to 
share research results or materials,” but this data is being debated.137  
By and large, there seems to be little empirical evidence to support 
the claim that patents on DNA molecules hinder research efforts.  
One study of 414 researchers in for-profit, government, and non-
profit entities found that only 5% of biomedical researchers checked 
for patent protection before beginning projects. 138  Only 1% had to 
delay a project due to others’ patents, and none were stopped from 
their projects completely.139  The consensus seems to be that there is 
“little empirical basis for claims that restricted access to [intellectual 
property] is currently impeding biomedical research.”140  “[D]espite 
numerous patents on upstream discoveries, academic researchers 
have accessed knowledge without the anticipated frictions.”141 
The complex countervailing effects of patents on the progress of 
genetic research are still unclear,142 but empirical data thus far does 
not conclusively support the argument that DNA patenting is stalling 
the progress of science rather than promoting it.  If the commerciali-
zation of biological research encourages more furtive or protective 
research practices looking forward, DNA patent holders may begin 
enforcing their patents rights more persistently.  As of now, though, 
 
136 REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 22. 
137 Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1092 n.28–32. 
138 Walsh, Cho & Cohen, supra note 130. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 2003.  The National Research Council of the National Academies reported similar 
conclusions, finding that “the number of projects abandoned or delayed as a result of dif-
ficulties in technology access is reported to be small, as is the number of occasions in 
which investigators revise their protocols to avoid intellectual property issues or in which 
they pay high costs to obtain intellectual property.”  REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, 
at 2. 
141 Walsh, Cho & Cohen, supra note 130. 
142 For a discussion of the complex positive and negative effects that patent protection has 
on innovation, see generally Arti K. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action:  The Case of 
Biotechnology Research with Low Commercial Value, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL REGIME 288 (Keith E. 
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
faculty_scholarship/1201 (discussing potential responses to research barriers created by 
patents on fundamental research tools). 
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an argument that DNA patents violate the spirit of the Patent Clause 
would likely fail without the empirical evidence to support it. 
B.  First Amendment Challenges to DNA Patents 
Justice Cardozo reasoned in Palko v. Connecticut that “[f]reedom of 
thought . . . is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom.  With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition 
of that truth can be traced in our history, political and legal.”143  “The 
First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of ‘speech,’” 
but the Supreme Court has “long recognized that its protection does 
not end at the spoken or written word.”144  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court has recognized a “right to receive information and ideas” as 
“an inherent corollary of the right of free speech and press” guaran-
teed by the First Amendment.145  To limit speech, the government ac-
tion must pass strict scrutiny—the government must show that it has a 
compelling state interest and that the grant is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.146  Thus, the government would likely defend 
against a First Amendment challenge by citing the State’s interest in 
encouraging the progress of the sciences, as provided by the Consti-
tution’s Patent Clause. 
Critics of DNA patenting, including the ACLU and the plaintiffs 
in Myriad, have attempted to mount a First Amendment challenge to 
DNA patenting147 by asserting that DNA, as the biological blueprint 
for protein production, is not merely a chemical compound but, 
more importantly, also a carrier of information.148  It is a physical mo-
lecule but also an “abstract concept.”149  Because DNA molecules are 
difficult to invent around,150 opponents argue that patents on DNA 
molecules are essentially a violation of the freedom of speech or 
 
143 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937). 
144 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (“[W]e have long eschewed any ‘narrow, literal concep-
tion’ of the [First] Amendment’s terms, . . . for the Framers were concerned with broad 
principles . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
145 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
146 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575, 582 (2001) (subjecting the 
Massachusetts regulations to strict scrutiny). 
147 See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra 
note 112, at 2–7 (arguing that the patent in question cannot be granted without violating 
the First Amendment). 
148 Id.; see also Kaye, supra note 52. 
149 Rogers, supra note 4, at 21–22.  Rogers even goes so far as to assert that “the gene is pri-
marily an abstract concept.”  Id. at 22. 
150 REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 22. 
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thought.151  Chris Hansen, an ACLU staff lawyer, argues that “[t]here 
is an endless amount of information on genes that begs for further 
discovery, and DNA patents put up unacceptable barriers to the free 
exchange of ideas.”152  ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero 
has opined that “granting patents that limit scientific research, learn-
ing and the free flow of information violates the First Amendment.”153 
The plaintiffs in Myriad supported their First Amendment argu-
ment by analogizing to copyright law.154  The fair use doctrine in cop-
yright law upholds First Amendment values in certain scenarios 
where they conflict with copyright law.155  In addition, copyright law 
draws a clear dichotomy between ideas and expression—while ex-
pression is copyrightable, mere ideas are not.156  The First Amend-
ment, the plaintiffs argued, applies similarly to preclude ideas from 
being patentable.157  If one adopts the view that DNA is indeed syn-
onymous with information, then it becomes easier to analogize DNA 
to speech or thought.  Judge Sweet seems to have favored this view in 
Myriad I, stating: 
The information encoded in DNA is not information about its own mo-
lecular structure incidental to its biological function, as is the case with 
adrenaline or other chemicals found in the body.  Rather, the informa-
tion encoded by DNA reflects its primary biological function:  directing 
the synthesis of other molecules in the body . . . .158 
The exclusion of abstract ideas from patentable subject matter,159 
though, may already preempt potential conflicts with the First 
 
151 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 108, at 32–36; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae American 
Civil Liberties Union, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), supra note 112, at 3–7 
(asserting that the business method patent claim at issue “involve[d] pure speech and/or 
thought” in violation of the First Amendment). 
152 Schwartz & Pollack, supra note 107. 
153 Kaye, supra note 52. 
154 Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 108, at 32–33. 
155 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (explaining that the fair 
use doctrine provides “breathing space within the confines of copyright”). 
156 17 U.S.C. § 102(B) (2006); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (holding that 
blank account-books are not the subject of copyright). 
157 Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 108, at 32–33. 
158 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted), rev’d in part and aff’d in 
part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 7, 2011). 
159 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (finding that a mathematical algo-
rithm is not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it is an abstract 
principle).  Compare id., with In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding 
that an improvement in oscilloscope technology that configured electronic circuitry to 
convert the input data to a form that would give a smoother-looking image was patentable 
because it was not an abstract idea, but a specific machine to produce a “useful, concrete, 
and tangible result[]”). 
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Amendment.  In other words, “[e]xisting patent doctrines, such as 
the abstract idea doctrine, can be interpreted to avoid the First 
Amendment issues.”160  The First Amendment argument would just be 
a redundant one if DNA molecules are deemed to be patent-
ineligible abstract ideas. 
However, if Myriad II remains good law (and DNA patents are not 
barred for ineligible subject matter), then the First Amendment issue 
would require an independent analysis.161  As noted previously, cate-
gorizing DNA as speech or thought would probably first require a de-
termination that DNA is primarily information.162  Thus far, there is 
no case law that addresses the intersection of patent law or DNA with 
the First Amendment.  Given the Federal Circuit’s reluctance to rec-
ognize DNA as primarily a carrier of information,163 though, other 
courts may be less inclined to view DNA as being synonymous with in-
formation and subject to First Amendment protection. 
While the Supreme Court has extended First Amendment protec-
tion to conduct that is communicative, not just speech, it has also 
emphasized that in communicative conduct, “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message [is] present, and in the surrounding circums-
tances the likelihood [is] great that the message would be unders-
tood by those who view[] it.”164  It is not clear, in this sense, that DNA 
patenting restricts the free flow of speech or thought.  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit’s unwillingness to characterize DNA as information 
and the stretch in viewing patenting as a restriction on speech or 
thought make likelihood of success for the First Amendment argu-
ment low.  As the plaintiffs in Myriad concede, the lack of preceden-
tial support is indicative of how radical the First Amendment argu-
ment is.165 
 
160 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), supra note 112, at 3. 
161 See id. (“[I]f the Court finds [a] patent can be granted despite . . . patent doctrines, it 
must necessarily reach the First Amendment issues.”). 
162 See supra notes 152–158 and accompanying text. 
163 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he district court disparaged the patent eligibility of isolated DNA molecules because 
their genetic function is to transmit information.  We disagree, as it is the distinctive na-
ture of DNA molecules as isolated compositions of matter that determines their patent 
eligibility rather than their physiological use or benefit.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 
7, 2011). 
164 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
165 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 108, at 37. 
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C.  Challenges to DNA Patents as Unconstitutional Deprivations of Property 
1.  The Scope of a Takings Challenge 
The government166 can wield its power of eminent domain, or the 
taking of private property for public use, but the Takings Clause re-
quires just compensation.167  “The theory behind the takings clause is 
that individuals should not have to bear public burdens that should 
be borne by the community as a whole.”168 
The Federal Circuit has held that patents are not property pro-
tected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment169 because pa-
tents grant the right to exclude rather than a positive right.170  In oth-
er words, the owner of a patent cannot bring a takings claim against 
the government for unauthorized use of the patent.  However, there  
may be another way to invoke the Takings Clause to  challenge one 
category of DNA patents.  Specifically, I posit that patents on DNA 
sequences that are (1) owned by the government and (2) obtained 
from individuals (3) without just compensation (and without permis-
sion) may face takings challenges.  This type of takings challenge is 
very narrow and distinct from the takings challenges that the Federal 
Circuit declined to recognize in Zoltek v. United States.171  In Zoltek, the 
property at issue was patent rights, whereas here, the property at issue 
is genetic material. 
2.  Is Patenting an Individual’s Genetic Material a Deprivation of 
Property? 
As a threshold issue, it is unclear whether a DNA patent owned by 
the government and derived from an individual’s genetic material 
qualifies as a taking.172  There are two types of takings:  a possessory 
 
166 The Supreme Court has found the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to be incor-
porated, so it applies to both federal and state government takings.  See Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (holding that state exercise 
of eminent domain without compensation violates the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
167 Id. at 240–41. 
168 Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century Part II:  Public Health Powers and 
Limits, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2979, 2983 (2000). 
169 The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[N]or shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
170 Zoltek v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
171 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
172 Although it is outside the scope of this Comment, a statute compelling the licensing of 
DNA patents in order to foster genetic research or increase the accessibility of genetic 
tests may also be attacked as a deprivation of property.  The owners of affected patents 
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taking occurs when the government confiscates173 or physically occu-
pies174 property, and a regulatory taking occurs when a government 
regulation leaves property with no economically viable use.175  A gov-
ernment entity’s use of an individual’s genetic material to develop a 
patent is unlikely to be considered a regulatory taking or a physical 
occupation in the traditional sense.  Whether it may be considered a 
confiscation is less clear, as the Supreme Court has yet to consider a 
takings case in the biological context. 
Even assuming that patenting a DNA molecule without permission 
from the material’s biological source would be considered a taking, 
the thornier question is whether genetic material is property.  The 
Supreme Court has held that, under the Takings Clause, property re-
fers not just to the “vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing 
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law” 
but “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the phys-
ical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.”176 
There is no consensus among courts about whether property 
rights exist in the body, and if so, how far they extend.  In examining 
this issue, courts review historical common law interests and state 
law.177  As the Ninth Circuit points out, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
referred to “the rights of possession and control of one’s own body” 
as the most “‘sacred’” and “‘carefully guarded’” of all rights.178  In line 
with this view, some courts have found quasi-property rights in bodily 
and genetic material,179 but the Supreme Court has never addressed 
the issue directly. 
 
could conceivably argue that such a government regulation reduces the economic value 
of their patent rights by artificially mandating competition where market control would 
otherwise be possible. 
173 Webb Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980) (finding a tak-
ing when the government confiscated interest on an interpleader account). 
174 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (“When faced 
with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this 
Court has invariably found a taking.”). 
175 Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding a taking when government regula-
tion of property use went “too far”). 
176 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945). 
177 Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 790–93 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that, under 
California law, a government coroner’s harvesting of a deceased individual’s corneas may 
be a taking of property from next of kin, requiring due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
178 Id. at 789 (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).  The 
Court in Union Pacific Railway Co. held that, in a civil tort action, a court cannot order the 
plaintiff, without her consent, to submit to a surgical examination before trial.  141 U.S. 
at 257. 
179 See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding unconstitutional 
deprivation of property in a dead body).  But see Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 898 (6th 
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A brief hypothetical will be useful for framing the analysis.  Im-
agine an individual with a genetic mutation that gives his saliva ex-
traordinary healing abilities.  If he is the only person in the world to 
have such medicinally valuable saliva, it would be difficult to argue 
that he has no property claim to his own saliva or the gene that makes 
it unique.  At the least, he has a better claim to those biological mate-
rials than any other individual in the world.  He has the ability to de-
cide, for example, whether to market his saliva and sell it for medi-
cinal purposes. 
Now, imagine that a government researcher procures a sample of 
the saliva legally but without obtaining the individual’s notice or con-
sent to patent the genetic material in it.  The researcher subsequently 
identifies the mutated gene, isolates it, and purifies it in order to pa-
tent the gene and market the encoded protein.  Under the Federal 
Circuit’s Myriad II decision, the isolated gene would be patentable 
subject matter, and any resulting patent could be financially lucrative.  
But the constitutional issue remains:  Could a patent on the gene be 
deemed a deprivation of the individual’s property? 
The hypothetical is limited, however, as demonstrated by just one 
change in the facts:  If the genetic mutation in question can be found 
in any other individuals, it is less likely to be deemed the first individ-
ual’s property.  It would be “no more unique to [the individual] than 
the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of he-
moglobin.”180 
The above example may seem far-fetched, perhaps resembling 
something out of a science-fiction novel.  But imagine a less extreme 
scenario, where, instead of unique saliva, an individual has mutated 
spleen cells with genetic material valuable to medical research.  This 
latter scenario reflects the general facts in Moore v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California, a seminal California case.  A discussion of Califor-
nia case law will illustrate the ambiguity of property rights in biologi-
cal materials. 
The California Supreme Court in Moore held that there is no con-
version liability in biological material removed from the human body 
such that they can be converted.181  At the same time, it seemed to 
leave open the possibility that property rights may exist in the body if 
public policy required such a result, by noting “we do not purport to 
 
Cir. 2010) (denying property rights in a dead body); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 
(8th Cir. 1984) (same).  For a discussion of California cases ruling differently on the is-
sue, see infra notes 203–13 and accompanying text. 
180 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 2002). 
181 Id. at 497. 
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hold that excised cells can never be property . . . .”182  In Moore, the 
plaintiff was told by doctors at a hospital that his spleen should be 
removed because he had hairy-cell leukemia.183  The doctors, howev-
er, did not tell him that his cells were unique and of great scientific 
value.184  They removed Moore’s spleen and retained, without his 
knowledge or consent, a portion of the organ for study.185  As a result 
of subsequent research, the university hospital established a cell line 
from Moore’s spleen cells and obtained a financially lucrative patent 
for it.186  While the court found that Moore had stated claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of patient consent, it declined to 
allow his property conversion claim to proceed because he had lost 
property interest in his removed spleen.187 
On the other hand, another case interpreting California law, Hecht 
v. Superior Court, did find property interests in biological material.  
The petitioner’s boyfriend had killed himself but saved his sperm for 
artificial insemination in her, as specified in his contract with the 
sperm bank and his will.188  His adult children requested that the 
sperm be destroyed, but the decedent’s girlfriend sought review after 
the lower court held in favor of the adult children.189  The appellate 
court concluded that at the time of his death, the decedent had a 
property interest in his sperm because he had decision-making au-
thority regarding them.190  Thus, Hecht supports the notion of proper-
ty rights in genetic material.191 
Perhaps the seemingly inapposite results in Moore and Hecht can 
be reconciled by the notion that sperm and other gametic material 
have closer ties to a person than spleen cells because sperm encom-
passes the potential for reproduction—a very personal decision which 
produces a unique result.  Put another way, human DNA, the very 
blueprint for individuality, may be regarded as higher on the “per-
 
182 Id. at 493. 
183 Id. at 481. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 481–82. 
187 Id. at 497. 
188 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
189 Id. at 276. 
190 Id. at 283. 
191 See also Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
next of kin have property rights in the bodies of deceased family members). 
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sonhood scale” than organs or body parts that are irreplaceable once 
removed from the body.192 
Under the personhood theory of property, the strength of proper-
ty rights in an object is related to “the kind of pain that would be oc-
casioned by its loss.”193  In other words, a person’s property is how he 
defines his personhood in relation to the extrinsic world.194  This 
theory is a “wholly subjective” view of property rights, focusing on the 
“personal embodiment or self-constitution in terms of ‘things.’”195  
Thus, it seems to follow naturally that, even more than external 
property may shape a person’s identify, a person’s body should be 
considered essential to his personhood. 
As Professor Margaret Radin points out, though, “[t]he idea of 
property in one’s body presents some interesting paradoxes.”196  We 
intuitively think of property as “something in the outside world,” so 
the body may be “too ‘personal’ to be property at all.”197  Yet many 
body parts, such as blood, hair, and organs can become “fungible 
commodities”—donated, sold, transfused, or transplanted—when 
removed from the body.198  The line between person and thing is thus 
ambiguous, but Radin suggests that a “perceptible boundary” seems 
intuitively necessary.199  In her view, “it seem[s] appropriate to call 
parts of the body property only after they have been removed from 
the system.”200 
Today, it is still unclear the extent of property rights afforded to 
various bodily interests.201  Courts have not clarified the extent of any 
property rights in biological materials, and statutes governing indi-
 
192 Margaret Jane Radin wrote an influential article on property rights through a person-
hood theory.  See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982). 
193 Id. at 959. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 958, 961 (“This article does not emphasize how the notion of personhood might 
figure in the most prevalent tradition of liberal property theory:  the Lockean labor-
desert theory, which focuses on individual autonomy, or the utilitarian theory, which fo-
cuses on individual autonomy, or the utilitarian theory which focuses on welfare maxima-
tion.”). 
196 Id. at 966. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 For example, “[t]oday, under federal law and all state statutory law except Louisiana, em-
bryos [created by in vitro fertilization] do not possess rights or have legal status.  In Loui-
siana, embryos have been given rights and limits have been imposed on how embryos may 
be treated.”  Elisa Kristine Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen Embryos, 4 
AM. J. FAM. L. 67, 84–85 (1990). 
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viduals’ control over their bodies in specific situations do not estab-
lish a general principle.202 
3.  Other Considerations in the Takings Analysis 
If there are indeed property rights to human genetic material,203 
they would likely be limited and considered to be quasi-property.204  
For instance, there may be a limitation on the right to sell body 
parts.205  And even if an individual can establish a legal property in-
terest in his genetic material, it is still unclear whether a court would 
ever deem a DNA patent to be an unconstitutional taking. 
That is because any takings claim related to DNA patents would be 
further complicated by questions about whether such a taking would 
be for “public use” and what “just compensation” entails.206  The Su-
preme Court has broadly held that a taking is for public use if it “ra-
tionally relate[s] to a conceivable public purpose.”207  The Court has 
interpreted the public use requirement broadly to cover almost any 
conceivable government justification for a taking.208  Presumably, 
then, a patent on genetic material would be for public use because, 
 
202 See Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty:  Toward a Property Right in Hu-
man Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 (1990). 
203 Genetic material from non-human sources may also arguably be considered property, 
although ownership of such property would be more difficult to establish. 
204 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509–10 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., 
dissenting) (“[L]imitation or prohibition diminishes the bundle of rights that would oth-
erwise attach to [property], yet what remains is still deemed in law to be a protectible 
[sic] property interest. . . . The same rule applies to Moore’s interest in his own body tis-
sue.”).  Courts have often found a quasi-property right over biological material.  See, e.g., 
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (1992) (“[A]ny interest that [the parties] have 
in . . . preembryos . . .  is not a true property interest.  However, they do have an interest 
in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making authority con-
cerning disposition of the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law.”). 
205 While sperm may be legally sold, state laws prohibit the selling of organs for public health 
reasons.  Sale of Organs and Related Statutes, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/135994.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (listing state statutes 
prohibiting organ sales). 
206 Just compensation, valued according to the market value to the owner as of the time of 
the taking, would be difficult to value and may even be zero.  See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984) (allowing petitioner to present evidence pertain-
ing to the change in market value of his land between the date of taking and the date of 
valuation); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979) (allowing respon-
dent the fair market value of its property rather than the cost of substitute facilities). 
207 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
208 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that governmental taking 
of property from one private owner to give to another for economic growth is a permissi-
ble public use). 
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by its nature, the subject of a patent enters the public realm and con-
tributes to scientific innovation. 
Courts may also choose to apply the Federal Circuit’s view in My-
riad II that DNA molecules, when isolated from native DNA, are 
chemically different entities from naturally existing DNA.  Under this 
approach, no DNA patent would cover any molecule that exists natu-
rally in the human body, making it even more difficult for individuals 
to argue that a DNA patent deprives them of any property interests in 
their DNA. 
Ultimately, the legal outcome of a takings challenge is unclear.  
What is clear is that such a challenge would need to revolve around 
an individual and would be limited in scope to the specific DNA pa-
tent in question.  In addition, even if a DNA patent is held to be a 
deprivation of property, it might only result in compensatory damag-
es and not patent invalidation. 
D.  The Fundamental Right to Autonomy and the Fallacy of “Natural” 
Infringement 
ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero has asserted that 
“[k]nowledge about our own bodies and the ability to make decisions 
about our health care are some of our most personal and fundamen-
tal rights.  The government should not be granting private entities 
control over something as personal and basic to who we are as our 
genes.”209 
Throughout constitutional jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
recognized certain liberties that are extratextual to the Constitution 
and Bill of Rights but deemed so important that they are protected 
under due process and equal protection.  Rights deemed to be fun-
damental must meet strict scrutiny review rather than the mere ra-
tional basis test.210  Contrary to Romero’s assertion, though, it is un-
settled whether the right to know about one’s own body is a 
fundamental right.  In determining which rights are fundamental, 
the Court has generally looked at the Framers’ intent and, at times, 
which liberties are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi-
tion.”211 
 
209 Kaye, supra note 52. 
210 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (articulating levels of 
judicial scrutiny); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (“Un-
der strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State’s asserted purpose must be 
specifically and narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.”). 
211 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
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Even assuming that the Court may recognize fundamental rights 
to know about one’s own body and make health care decisions, 
though, Romero’s argument still misses the point.  First, DNA patents 
do not generally interfere with individuals’ health care decisions.  In 
fact, they frequently offer new health care options in the form of ge-
netic tests, whether or not an individual may be able to afford them.  
Instead, Romero’s argument seems to echo the oft-raised concern 
that individuals could be exposed to “natural” infringement, or in-
fringement for simply carrying a patented DNA molecule in one’s 
cells.212 
However, natural infringement is not a legitimate concern and 
therefore raises no fundamental rights issues.  As discussed previous-
ly, patents cannot claim naturally occurring genes that are unpuri-
fied.213  Instead, a patent on a naturally occurring DNA sequence 
must claim the isolated and purified version of the DNA molecule, 
which, by definition, does not include any naturally occurring form 
inside the body.214 
The same applies in the context of gene therapy.  Gene therapy 
involves the transfer of “genetic sequences or genetically modified 
organisms to human beings for investigational or therapeutic ends.”215  
Gene therapy can allow manipulation of an individual’s genome, for 
instance by inserting a wild-type gene in place of a mutated one to fix 
genetic errors and prevent certain diseases.  Even in these cases, a 
DNA patent would never reach a DNA sequence inserted into human 
cells because the DNA sequence becomes a different chemical mole-
cule once it is inserted and incorporated into the human genome.  As 
a result, there is little chance that “natural” infringement would pose 
any constitutional threat to DNA patenting, and concerns about fun-
damental rights are misplaced. 
 
 
 
212 See generally DAVID KOEPSELL, WHO OWNS YOU:  THE CORPORATE GOLD RUSH TO PATENT 
YOUR GENES 1 (2009) (“[T]hanks to creative interpretations and applications of patent 
laws, parts of living things can be owned.  Patents have been issued, in surprisingly large 
numbers, on the essential building blocks of multiple life forms.”). 
213 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 62, at 1093. 
214 Id. 
215 Jonathan Kimmelman,  The Ethics of Human Gene Transfer, 9 NATURE REVS.:  GENETICS 239, 
239 (2008). 
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III.  LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
While the constitutional challenges to DNA patents discussed 
above are largely misplaced, limited, or unlikely to succeed at this 
point in time, these arguments and new ones may gain traction over 
time.  The future potential of genetic technologies should instill 
mixed feelings of excitement and trepidation.216  Already, genetic test-
ing, like BRCA screening, and genetically manipulated products, like 
human growth hormone, are becoming readily available.  It is not dif-
ficult to imagine a day when genetic manipulation—the ability to cor-
rect genetic errors and alter physical and mental attributes like 
strength and concentration—becomes an option.217  Given our world 
of scarce resources, though, genetic technologies will probably be-
come accessible to some people but not to others, which may raise 
“profound social issues”218 and pose “a serious and fundamental 
threat to our social and political system.”219 
According to Maxwell Mehlman and Jeffrey Botkin, whether 
people will obtain access to genetic technologies depends on three 
factors:  “[1] whether there is a supply shortage created by technical 
conditions; [2] whether the technologies are covered by public or 
private insurance; and [3] whether people have the information they 
need to seek access.”220  The first of these factors—supply—could be 
largely dependent on the future willingness of DNA patent holders to 
license their technologies.  A market trend in choosing to restrict li-
censing or other rights would affect the availability and pricing of ge-
netic tests. 
“[F]or the time being,” it seems that third-party patents “rarely” 
pose a risk to biological research.221  But there is some evidence that, 
as genetic technologies are becoming more commercially valuable, 
patent holders are more likely to protect their intellectual property.  
For example, one study found an increase, albeit a small one, in the 
enforcement of biological patents between 2000 and 2005:  in 2000, 
only 3% of scientists received notifications of third party patent 
 
216 See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME:  THE CHALLENGE 
TO EQUALITY 104 (1998) (“What is clear is that the genetic technologies of the future 
come with a curse.  They promise great advances in our ability to forecast and forestall 
disease and to improve the capabilities of the human species.”). 
217 Id. at 90 (describing potential genetic technologies). 
218 Id. at 87. 
219 Id. at 105. 
220 Id. at 87. 
221 Walsh, Cho & Cohen, supra note 130, at 2002 (emphasis added). 
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rights, whereas 5% received notifications in 2005.222  Moreover, there 
is empirical evidence showing that DNA patents may have an adverse 
impact on the availability or costs of genetic tests, not just research.223  
According to one estimate, 25% of labs have had to abandon one or 
more genetic tests as a result of patents,224 and another study found 
that 30% of clinical labs had to abandon testing for the HFE gene af-
ter the patent issued.225 
“The extensive use of patents can give rise to important dilemmas 
in terms of equitable access to the object of patents, particularly when 
they are useful for meeting basic human needs.”226  Assuming that ra-
tioning in our health care system will, to some extent, be based on 
socioeconomic factors going forward, access to genetic technologies 
will also be allocated according to those factors.227  Impediments to 
genetic technologies, such as affordability, will disproportionately af-
fect those who cannot afford them with their own resources.228  A 
growing rift in access to genetic technologies could pose social equal-
ity issues, the severity of which cannot be predicted.229  On one hand, 
acceptance and change in technology may be so gradual that society 
adjusts to them naturally.230  On the other hand, there is the potential 
for genetic social stratification, a prospect that “clearly threatens de-
mocracy, but it is not clear how seriously.”231 
CONCLUSION 
Thus far, courts in the United States have only addressed the pa-
tentability of isolated DNA molecules and genetic technologies under 
the Patent Act and found them to be patentable subject matter.  
Though constitutional challenges have been raised, they have not 
been addressed by any court.  Yet these challenges pose interesting 
 
222 See id. 
223 Caulfield et al., supra note 8, at 1092. 
224 Mildred K. Cho, Samantha Illangasekare, Meredith A. Weaver, Debra G.B. Leonard & Jon 
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MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003). 
225 See Jon F. Merz, Antigone G. Kriss, Debra G. B. Leonard & Mildred K. Cho, Commentary, 
Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002) (discussing the award of pa-
tents for the diagnostic test for haemochromatosis). 
226 LOUISE BERNIER, JUSTICE IN GENETICS:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
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227 MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 216, at 87. 
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questions regarding the goals of our patent system, the extent of con-
stitutional protections, and our perception of DNA.  Never before has 
intellectual property posed questions so closely linked to personhood 
and individuality and challenged how we define ourselves. 
This Comment focused on four emerging constitutional chal-
lenges to DNA patents and touched on the future impact of genetic 
technologies.  Given the current constitutional jurisprudence, colla-
borative research environment, and relatively open licensing practic-
es, none of the constitutional challenges to DNA patents considered 
seem compelling enough to succeed today. 
A First Amendment or Patent Clause challenge would probably 
apply the most broadly to patents claiming isolated DNA molecules.  
The First Amendment argument would be particularly intriguing if 
the Supreme Court someday views DNA as not only a chemical mole-
cule but also information.  Arguments based on the Takings Clause, 
though narrow in scope, may also gain traction if the judicial and so-
cietal trend increasingly recognizes property interests in biological 
material.  Even under the personhood view of property, though, it is 
not clear that DNA should be considered individual property.  Final-
ly, there is little risk that DNA patents would violate fundamental 
rights by constituting natural infringement. 
Where advancements in genetic technologies will take society is 
anyone’s guess.  However, with genetic progress comes the risk of po-
larizing society and marginalizing equal rights.  As the landscape and 
public perception of DNA patenting continues to evolve, the consti-
tutional arguments discussed may become more compelling, and new 
constitutional issues may develop.  But for the time being, critics to 
DNA patenting may need to turn to policy reform through the legis-
lative process. 
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